The most basic meaning of democracy is majority rule, whether the majority be defined by race, religion, ethnicity, language, economic interest, or just a common opinion. The attractions of democracy are the freedom enjoyed by the majority from being ruled by one or a few, and the tolerance shown among the members of the majority. The problem of democracy is the status of the minority: will they be tolerated or oppressed? Will a perception of their victimization make the minority unreasonable? Will mutual suspicion destroy the common good? The history of democracy is marred by cycles of violent conflict between majorities and minorities, followed by dictatorship embraced by all for the sake of civil peace, or by foreign domination (Fed. 9, 10, 51). These tendencies are widely and regrettably evident today, perhaps most vividly in the Caucasus.

The successful democracies are those that, since the 17th Century, have been able to establish powerful institutions that protect essential rights and liberties (life, property, religion, speech, and association) of all individuals, whether of the majority or the minority. This kind of democracy is liberal democracy. The liberal principle is that each individual has a pre-political right to use their own capacities as they choose--consistent with the equal rights of others and with the common good (Fed. 10). To make freedom of religion, speech, and association effective, the right to property and to its productive use by owners, employers, and workers must be secure, for "In the general course of human nature, a power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will" (Fed. 79). Hence, privatization and the system of contract law supporting private property and enterprise is of crucial importance for the viability of liberal democr acy, and is a life and death issue for the postcommunist transition.

A republic is "a [system of] government in which the scheme of representation takes place," so that the activities of governing are delegated "to a small number of citizens elected by the rest," who must accordingly represent the electorate (Fed. 10). The detailed structure of "the scheme of representation"--the specific arrangements of the public offices--is the constitution of the republic; it constitutes the political life of the republic and shapes the private lives of citizens.

A republic is to be contrasted with a monarchy: in a pure or absolute monarchy, the governing power (the throne) is completely independent of the people, who thus enjoy no self-government. In a republic, the governing power is, in some way, dependent on the people. But a republic could be either aristocratic or democratic. A democratic republic is one in which the delegated representatives are drawn "from the great body of the society" so that the "government . . . derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people" (Fed. 39). This means that those in power have no power in their own right. Democratic republic and representative democracy are synonomous terms. In contrast, an aristocratic republic is one in which an elite minority, "a favored class" (Fed. 39) with a special, permanent and distinct interest is represented either exclusively or along with the majority of the people. In an aristocratic republic, the r epresentation of the favored class (the aristocracy) cannot be changed or removed by popular elections.

Separation of powers is related to the idea of political liberty: separation of powers is a condition necessary for the protection of liberty in any form of government, whether monarchic or republican. "There can be no liberty where the legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates, [or] if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers" (Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws XI.6, and Fed. 47). The anti-tyrannic function of separation of powers is stated most radically by Madison: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny" (Fed. 47).

In order to secure the separation of powers by keeping each power within its limits, it is necessary to combine the powers partially in the same person or body. The presidential veto over parliamentary or congressional legislation is an example: the veto is a legislative power in the hands of the executive whereby he can defend himself against legislative encroachments. Such arrangements of the structure of separation of powers, whereby one sector can check and balance with its own power the power of another sector, are called "checks and balances." Therefore, separation of powers including checks and balances can be formulated as follows: "where the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands which possess the whole power of another department, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted" (Fed. 47). Separation of powers and checks and balances can be designed against the defects and dangers specifi c to each form of government.

The danger in a monarchy consists in the accumulation of all powers in the hands of the king and thereby the corruption of the king into a tyrant.

The danger in an aristocratic republic consists in the accumulation of power in the representatives of the privileged class, and thereby the corruption of the aristocracy into an oligarchy: rule by a minority with great wealth and no concern for the common good. Such a despotic minority rules only for the preservation and increase of its own power and wealth. Oligarchic society is thus divided into the wealthy and corrupt minority and the powerless and poor majority.

As described above, the danger in a democratic republic consists in the accumulation of power in the representatives of the majority (Fed. 48), leading to oppression of minorities (however defined), and violent conflict between the two. Dictatorship can often follow by popular choice due to the universal insecurity of life and property in a civil war. Factional conflict and dictatorship are the most serious diseases to which democracy is most vulnerable (Fed. 9, 10, 51).

The specific defects and the corresponding remedial design of checks and balances define the major objectives of the constitution in each form of government. In a democratic republic, protection against factional conflict and dictatorship implies that stability and liberty must be principal objectives of the constitution. "Stability in government is essential to national character . . . as well as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which are among the chief blessings of civil society" (Fed. 37). In addition, the objective of good popular representation follows from the republican form of government itself. Finally, in any form of government, defense of national independence against foreign intervention requires energy in the executive. But these four objectives--popular representation, liberty, stability, and energy--are almost always in tension. Weighing these competing ends of government demands an extraordinary degree of judgment in political men and women. And this presupposes "that spirit of moderation which is essential to a just estimate" of public measures (Fed. 37). Unfortunately, "it is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs . . . that this spirit is more apt to be diminished than promoted by those occasions which require an unusual exercise of it" (Fed. 37). In fact, any major political issue "may be viewed in so many lights and relations and . . . touches the springs of so many passions and interests" (Fed. 37), that human moderation and judgment need institutional support against the power of passions and interests that would undermine the common good. The promotion of moderation is, therefore, a principal function of separation of powers and checks and balances in a republic. We can summarize this complex line of reasoning with a simple formulation. In a republic, two things are of supreme importance: popular representation and rational d eliberation.

Representation. Those delegated to govern (especially those in the legislative branch) should represent faithfully the interests and opinions of those who elected them. But not all interests and opinions are just and true (consider, for example, the interest in maintaining slavery in the United States up to 1865), and those that are partially just and true are always in conflict with other partial interests and opinions. The political words "party," "partisan," "particular," come from "part": as human, we are moved by only a part of the whole, namely, that part to which we are attached by powerful passions that can distort our vision of the whole truth.

Deliberation. Rational deliberation is the attempt to overcome our partiality (by seeing and weighing the other parts of the problem) and to judge wisely; a good judge is impartial. In a republic, the political process consists in a ceaseless clash of partisan positions, positions that are often angry and potentially violent (Fed. 10). In a republic, therefore, it is essential that rational deliberation have a place in the system of government for the sake of stability and the common good. A good republic is one in which faithful representation of the people is balanced by the rational deliberation of the representatives. A bad republic is one in which legitimate interests of the people are not represented, and rational deliberation is undermined by extremists or corruptionists. Extremists are those who willfully destroy human judgment by the instigation of hatred attaching to extreme and false opinions. Extremist individuals and parties often degenerate into v iolent, narcissistic paranoia. A republican constitution that permits or promotes extremists in the legislative body is like a doctor that produces sickness instead of health.

The corruption of elected representatives, and of the leaders of business, unions, churches, schools and media destroys the people's belief in the very possibility of good government. In a republic, a popular mentality of cynicism and resignation is the political equivalent of AIDS.

In all forms of government, separation of powers and checks and balances must prevent accumulation of all powers in the same hands. In a republic, separation of powers must in addition promote, through checks and balances, rational deliberation as the necessary accompaniment to popular representation. Modern republicanism, as understood by The Federalist, is the study of human qualities and institutional arrangements that can combine representation and deliberation. This study and the resulting political practice are what republicanism offers concerning the historic problem of wisdom and consent in a democracy.