55. Ibid.
56. Ibid. See also Madison's remark on Athens in Federalist No. 63, p. 384.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid., p. 82.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., p. 83.
64. Cf. Epstein, The Political Theory of the Federalist, p. 108.
65. Ibid., p. 77.
66. Harvey C. Mansfield, Jr.: "The Question of Conservatism," The Harvard Review of Philosophy, Spring 1993, p. 33.
67. Tocqueville, Letter to his father, 1831, in George W. Pierson, Tocqueville and Beaumont in America (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938), p. 582.
68. Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner, The Guilded Age: A Tale of Today (1873); quoted in Paul F. Boller, Jr., American Thought in Transition: The Impact of Evolutionary Naturalism, 1865-1900 (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1969), p. xi.
69. Federalist No. 39, p. 240.
70. Spirit of the Laws XI.6, p. 157.
71. Federalist No. 37, p. 228.
72. Federalist No. 47, p. 301.
73. See the excellent account by William Kristol, "The Problem of the Separation of Powers: Federalist 47-51," in Charles R. Kesler, ed., Saving the Revolution (New York: The Free Press, 1987).
74. Federalist No. 47, p. 301.
75. Ibid.
76. Plato, Republic, 562a-576b; Aristotle, Politics, 1313a33-1314a29.
77. Article 16; Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, eds., The Human Rights Reader (New York: New American Library, 1989), p. 120.
78. Marshall, "Separation of Powers, Human Rights, and Constitutional Government," p. 20; see also Herbert J. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago, 1981), pp. 53-63.
79. Politics III.7-9.
80. Federalist No. 39, p. 241.
81. Federalist No. 46, p. 294.
82. Federalist No. 39, p. 241.
83. Federalist No. 47, pp. 301-302.
84. Ibid., p. 304.
85. Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, p. 61.
86. Federalist No. 47, pp. 302-303.
87. Ibid., p. 308.
88. Federalist No. 48, p. 308.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid., p. 309.
91. Ibid., p. 309.
92. Ibid.
93. For a recent example, see Gagnon, "Serbia's Road to War," pp. 128-129.
94. Federalist No. 52, p. 327.
95. Ceaser, "Constitutionalism and a Semiparty System in the United States," pp. 229-235.
96. Federalist No. 48, p. 311.
97. Ibid.
98. Ibid., p. 310.
99. Federalist No. 79, p. 472.
100. Federalist No. 48, pp. 311-312.
101. Kristol, "The Problem of the Separation of Powers," p. 113.
102. Quoted by Madison in Federalist No. 49, p. 313.
103. Federalist No. 49, p. 313.
104. Ibid., p. 314.
105. Ibid., pp. 314-316.
106. Ibid., p. 314.
107. Federalist No. 37, p. 226.
108. Federalist No. 54, p. 337. See also Locke, Second Treatise, §§ 22-24 and 91, pp. 324-326 and 370.
109. "Distrust is a pervasive legacy of communist rule." Richard Rose, "Postcommunism and the Problem of Trust," Journal of Democracy Vol. 5 (July 1994), p. 18. The communist regimes usually destroyed trust in any relations beyond family and intimate friends. The roots of distrust in Southeastern Europe and Russia (not to mention the Middle East), however, probably go deeper in history, arising from centuries of arbitrary personal rule, i.e. generations without rule of law in the ancient and medieval sense.
110. Federalist No. 49, pp. 314-315.
111. Ibid., p. 315.
112. Ibid., p. 317.
113. Ibid.
114. Federalist No. 50, p. 318.
115. Ibid., p. 319.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. Ibid.
119. Federalist No. 51, p. 320.
120. Ibid.
121. Ibid., p. 321.
122. Ibid.
123. Ibid.
124. Ibid., p. 322.
125. Ibid., pp. 322-323.
126. Ibid., p. 321.
127. Federalist No. 78, p. 467.
128. Ibid., p. 465.
129. Federalist No. 78, pp. 466 and 469.
130. Ibid., p. 466.
131. Federalist No. 10, p. 83. For example, if the population of a country were permanently eighty percent agricultural, even separation of powers would not protect the domestic manufacturing interests from oppressive tax legislation. For in the course of one or two generations, all branches of government, even the judiciary, would be dominated by the same agricultural interest. In the plan of The Federalist, the size of the United States and laws fostering economic diversity should prevent this from happening.
132. Federalist No. 51, p. 325.
133. Ibid., p. 324. The American Supreme Court would be a dangerous power independent of society if it were united to the executive or legislative powerFederalist 78, above; hence the importance of a judiciary that has "neither force nor will but merely judgment." We thus return to the specifically American question of the relation between the original constitutional design and the actual history of American constitutional interpretation.
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