



ON PRINCIPLE

February 2000 • John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs • VOL. VIII, NO. 1

Terror, Terror Everywhere

David Tucker

As the turn of the century approached, the U.S. government repeatedly warned Americans that terrorists might attack either in the United States or overseas.

Many incidents toward the end of 1999 made this warning seem real. The government of Jordan arrested a group of militant Muslims they accused of involvement in terrorism, and news reports claimed that they were involved in a plot against the United States. A man was arrested trying to smuggle explosives across the border from Canada into the State of Washington, while another man and woman were arrested trying to sneak into Vermont from Canada. Investigations linked the people arrested in Vermont with the man arrested in Washington, and connected both to a radical Islamic terrorist group in Algeria. In the face of such events, Seattle canceled part of its New Year's celebration. Meanwhile, a threat was received that mail from Frankfurt, Germany to the United States might contain bombs, and German officials slowed the mail for inspection.

As it happened, no terrorist attacks occurred. What are we to make then of the flurry of reports and incidents related to terrorism that accumulated in December? We might well ask about them what

people are asking about the other great pre-millennium scare, the Y2K problem. Was there a real problem or was it just media-driven exaggeration?

As far as terrorism is concerned, the danger was and is real, but it has also been exaggerated. The exaggerations occur often because people look at our complex and remarkably open society and imagine all the

Terrorism has costs—in money, time, political support and the personal safety of terrorists—that constrain what terrorists can do. By keeping the cost of terrorism high, we have minimized its danger.

things that terrorists could do to us. If they can blow up large public buildings, why could they not use computer attacks to take down our banking system or power supply or use chemical weapons in a subway or at the Super Bowl? But people forget that taking advantage of our vulnerabilities is not free. Terrorism has costs—in money, time, political support and the personal safety of the terrorists—that constrain what terrorists can do. In addition, since the United States began to pay attention to the terrorist threat a little over 30 years ago, we have learned

a good deal about how to raise the costs that terrorists must pay. By keeping the cost of terrorism high, we have minimized and managed the danger of terrorism.

To put the terrorism warnings and arrests of the New Year in perspective, we need to understand what is real and what is exaggeration in the danger posed by terrorism. When we have a sense of this we can better decide what needs to be done to counter terrorism. This is especially true of the newest and most disturbing terrorist threat: an attack that causes mass casualties.

The Danger

Terrorism is premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatants to influence an audience. Terrorists use violence not primarily to harm or kill the particular people who are their victims but to intimidate a larger audience. Terrorists attack individuals or property in order to scare the population at large or the government into doing what they want it to. Terrorism, then, is violent public persuasion.

In so far as terrorism is public persuasion, it is essentially a political activity, although a perverse one. It is perverse not because it is vio-

Tucker: *continued on page 3*

Man of the Century

January 24, 2000. It was exactly thirty-five years ago on this day that Winston Churchill died. This massive fact enters my mind now because for months I have been bombarded



Peter W. Schramm

with a lot of non-sense about who should be named Person of the Century. *Time* magazine said that the first criteria (among three) they used was this: “The grand struggle between totalitarianism and democracy.” And they chose Albert Einstein. Fifty years ago, *Time* chose Churchill as “Man of the Half Century.” A change of editors, I guess.

It is a self-evident fact to me that Churchill is the man of the century. He is the one who foresaw the Communist and then the Nazi menace and was able to see the nature of their loathsome ideologies. He is the one who so vigorously articulated the necessity of preparation, and the one who—almost alone—in May of 1940 stood up to those British leaders who had become persuaded that Germany would win and thereby were willing to cut a deal with Hitler. He is the one who then sent not only his battalions, but also the English language into battle (as John F. Kennedy put it). He is the one who told his countrymen that they would have “victory at all costs, victory in spite of all terror, victory however long and hard the road might be.” If there is any one man responsible for saving the best in our civilization in the twentieth-century, it is Winston Churchill.

But perhaps the contemporary world’s inability to understand human excellence and human greatness shouldn’t be that surprising. I am

reminded of an incident a few years back. A freshman student, a large well-proportioned athlete, came storming into my office a few weeks after classes had started. He was waving a copy of Churchill’s *The Gathering Storm* (the first volume of his six on World War II) which was assigned reading in a freshman level politics class. He seemed very angry. I will paraphrase what he said to me (leaving out his imprecations):

“Who is this guy Churchill. Until this week I have never heard of him. I went through high school never even having heard the name mentioned. I heard the name Hitler and Stalin, but I never heard the name Churchill. I am reading his book. This is tremendous. This is a great book. I can’t put it down. I love this guy! And I hear that he wrote other books. I should have heard about this guy in high school. This guy did some interesting things, and he was a good man. How come I never heard of him? I love this guy.”

There are some things that are clear about Churchill’s youth. He was an active, ambitious young man. He sought out a life of action. He was not a very good student in school. Most subjects bored him. He certainly couldn’t learn Greek or Latin, and he didn’t see why he should. He was irritated that examinations were backwards. He said: “I should have liked to be asked what I knew. They always tried to ask what I did not know.” But he didn’t ignore the English language. He studied it, and used it. “I got into my bones the essential structure of the normal British sentence—which is a noble thing.”

By his own account he didn’t start taking his own education seriously until he got to India in 1896. He was twenty-two years old. He began to appreciate what he had missed. He had a lot of time on his hands and, aside from playing polo, he started

reading books: Plato, Aristotle, Macaulay, Gibbon, and others.

So in Bangalore, India, he gave himself an education. He said: “It was a curious education. First because I approached it with an empty, hungry mind and with fairly strong jaws; and what I got I bit.” And we should be glad he did, because he learned what was worth fighting for, and why.

He went to South Africa as a reporter to cover the Anglo-Boer War. The troop train he was on was attacked and he heroically contributed to the escape of the men, but was himself captured. He was put in prison. Writing from the Boer prison, on November 30, 1899, his twenty-fifth birthday, he wrote to a friend: “I am twenty five today. It is terrible to think how little time remains.” Soon after writing this he escaped to Mozambique, and then arranged to be placed in a fighting unit.

By 1900, as he reached his twenty-sixth birthday, he had already published five books, including his only novel *Savrola*, and was also elected to Parliament. In a letter to a friend he warned that this new century “will witness the great war for the existence of the individual.”

Along the way to that war he became Home Secretary, First Lord of the Admiralty, Secretary of State for the Colonies, First Lord again, then Prime Minister and Minister of Defence. After the war he came here to give “The Iron Curtain Speech,” and a few years later became Prime Minister again. In 1953 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature. This man of action, this great friend of the idea of the individual, also wrote another twenty books, during his free time.

Time magazine was right. This was not the Person of the Century. Churchill was the *Man* of the Century, a great and good man. We have short memories. ♦

Tucker: *continued from page 1*

lent (the American Revolutionaries used violence to end the injustice of British rule) but because it is violence against innocents. Terrorists typically do not attack the soldiers or the officials of the government they are contending with. This would be too difficult; the costs would be too high. Instead they kill or harm people who have no connection to the problem that motivates them as long as in doing so they think they can further their cause. The explosions at the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, which Muslim extremist Osama bin Ladin has been accused of organizing, killed 25 times more Africans (some of them Muslims) than Americans.

While the number of domestic terrorist incidents in the United States has been low compared to some other countries in the past three decades, international terrorists—terrorists operating on the territory or against the citizens of more than one country—have targeted Americans more often than any other nationality. There are several reasons for this.

Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has been the dominant power in the world. Many of those who wanted to establish new states, seize power in old ones or carry out socioeconomic revolutions have seen the United States as the greatest obstacle to their aspirations, and they have used terrorism against us in hopes of achieving their goals.

During the Cold War, many of these terrorist groups were aided by the Soviet Union, its allies in eastern Europe and other parts of the world. Currently, those who see our way of life and our close association with Saudi Arabia, for example, as a threat to Islam target us. Because

Americans are so active in the world, as businessmen, journalists, educators, missionaries, and tourists, we present our enemies with a tempting array of targets. Domestically, our great wealth allows even marginal groups and individuals to subsist and use violence if they choose to. The freedom we enjoy as individuals gives them plenty of room to operate.

That Americans have been the principal terrorist target has become an especial cause of concern lately because of a growing sense, reflected in numerous newspaper articles and televised reports (including a short time ago a series on ABC's *Nightline*), suggesting that a terrorist attack with a chemical, biological or radiological weapon capable of causing mass casualties or a computer attack on our financial system causing mass disruption are now more likely or even inevitable. President Clinton himself has said that he expects such an attack to occur some time in the future.

Students of terrorism have noted several reasons to think that mass casualty terrorist attacks might now be more likely. First, at least one of these attacks has already occurred. In 1995, the group Aum Shinrikyo used sarin gas in the Tokyo subway system, killing 12 and injuring several thousand. This episode and the use of chemical or biological agents against civilians by Iraq, for example, have slowly eroded the taboo against the use of mass casualty weapons that once prevailed. This erosion has occurred because means and motives have coincided.

Technologies of all sorts are more readily available today than before and human ingenuity can find ways to put them to evil uses. The means are at hand, for example, to make viruses that can destroy human lives, a nation's crops, or its computers' memories. Terrorists have a motive

for such evil ingenuity, some think, because terrorists must find ways to attract attention to their causes even as traditional methods—bombings, shootings, hijackings—become too familiar to excite interest or too dif-

Tucker: *continued on page 4*

Spring 2000 Colloquium Series

Gary Rosen

Associate Editor, Commentary
on

Was James Madison
A Turncoat?

Friday, February 25

Kimberly Shankman

*Associate Professor of
Politics and Government,
Ripon College*
on

Compromise and
Republican Statecraft:
The Political Thought
of Henry Clay

Friday, March 17

Michael Uhlmann

*Vice President for
Public Policy Research,
Bradley Foundation*
on

Reflections on Assisted
Suicide and Euthanasia

Friday, March 24

Karl Walling

Fellow, The Liberty Fund
on

Why America Won the Cold
War: Alexander Hamilton
and American Freedom

Friday, April 7

*All Colloquia are free and
open to the public. They
begin at 3:00 p.m. and are
held at the Ashbrook Cen-
ter at Ashland University.*

Tucker: *continued from page 3*

difficult because of security measures.

Finally, over the past decade terrorist groups have emerged that do not depend on states for support. Financed by drug trafficking, extortion or the contributions of wealthy sympathizers, these groups are loosely organized, difficult to track and not constrained by the policies of states, which tend to be more cautious because they have more to lose if they defy the conventions that govern international conduct.

These arguments all contain some truth, but the whole truth leads to a more balanced view of the danger we face. Consider the case of Aum Shinrikyo. This group did manage to manufacture a poison gas and disseminate it in a subway. But the gas was not very pure and the delivery system not very effective. Most of those injured in the attack suffered from shock or the fear that the gas had made them sick, not from the ill effects of the gas. Aum was fanatical and well financed and better staffed with good scientific talent than any other terrorist group has been. Yet, it still had little to show for its efforts to develop the kind of mass casualty weapon we hear so much about now. In fact, Aum turned to gas after failing to make effective weapons out of botulinum and anthrax. It actually spread some of these agents but they failed to work. The case of Aum shows how difficult to overcome are the technological barriers to the development of mass casualty weapons.

Could terrorists not go out and buy a mass casualty weapon rather than develop their own? Such weapons are held by only a few countries. Some of these countries, it is true, support terrorists, but there is no evidence that one has been willing to give a mass casualty weapon to a

terrorist group. Such groups have been known to change masters and to stab their old masters in the back. It would be a foolish master who would arm his untrustworthy servant with such a powerful weapon.

Just as technical obstacles make developing a mass casualty weapon an exceedingly difficult chore, so do different but equally formidable obstacles arise for anyone wanting to develop the capability to destroy our information systems.

It is one thing, and a relatively simple one, to deface a web page. It is altogether a different thing to analyze and attack an information system in a fundamental way, especially if that system is protected and those

Is it always easier for terrorists to use force against us than for us to use force against them. We present many more targets to the terrorists than they present to us.

who run it are alert.

Developing the expertise to carry out a serious information system attack would take considerable time and money. Would terrorists want to pay those costs? They might try to hire the necessary talent, but this would impose another cost: diminished security. Could the terrorists trust such hired guns? Would they take the risk?

To be willing to take the risks and pay the costs associated with developing mass casualty or disruption weapons, terrorists would have to have powerful motivations to do so. On balance, such motivations appear to be lacking.

Bombs made from conventional explosives have long been the favorite weapon of terrorists. They are capable of creating devastating damage, as the bombings of the World

Trade Center, our embassies in Africa, and the Federal building in Oklahoma City attest. Terrorists can inflict all the pain they want and generate all the publicity they need with old-fashioned methods. They appear to have no need to pay the higher costs associated with more exotic weapons.

Nor is it the case that the constraints of state support are no longer in evidence. Osama bin Ladin is considered the very model of the new autonomous terrorist, but he depends now on the sanctuary given him by the government of Afghanistan.

Our experience has been that we can pressure states that support terrorism and that the states in turn curtail the activity of the terrorists they support. This process worked with Libya, which has turned over for trial two people indicted for their role in blowing up a Pan Am jet a decade ago. We have now begun this process with Afghanistan by persuading the UN to impose sanctions on the country. While some terrorists do operate in small autonomous groups without direct state support, such groups are unlikely to have the resources to pay the high costs exotic weapons impose. Finally, although eroded, the taboo against the use of mass casualty weapons still exists and threatens those who break it with terrible retribution.

Managing the Danger

To argue that the threat of a mass casualty or information terrorist attack is less likely than often supposed is not to argue that such attacks will never happen. They remain a possibility. But in seeing the difficulties that terrorists face in carrying them out, we realize that we are not helpless. We can protect ourselves by continuing the policy of raising the

Tucker: *continued on page 5*

Tucker: *continued from page 4*

costs that terrorists and their supporters must pay to carry out attacks, whether of the traditional or newer variety. As the costs rise, fewer and fewer terrorists and supporters can or will pay them.

Raising the costs of terrorism has been our strategy from the beginning of our struggle with terrorism. In the course of this struggle, we have learned or should have learned a few lessons.

First, we have learned or should have learned to attack terrorists where they are weak and we are strong. This sounds like common sense but one still occasionally hears calls for the use of military force against terrorists as a sure way to put an end to this scourge. The fact is that it is always easier for the terrorists to use force against us than for us to use force against them. We present many more targets to the terrorists than they present to us. In any tit-for-tat violent exchange, therefore, we are likely to come out the worse. We are better off relying on economic sanctions and our ability to cajole and persuade other countries and international organizations to cooperate in the struggle against terrorism by imposing sanctions on states that support terrorism and prosecuting individuals who engage in it. No terrorist organization or state supporter of terrorism can match us in this arena.

Our military might is not useless against terrorism but must be used very sparingly. Given the small-scale and dispersed character of terrorist organizations military force often ends up striking targets of marginal worth. The strikes, however, often blunt our efforts to persuade people and governments that terrorism is unacceptable. Following the bombing of our embassies in Africa, much of the commentary in the Muslim press

around the world was as outraged as our own at this wanton taking of innocent life. Following our retaliation with cruise missiles against a factory in Sudan we may have mistakenly associated with bin Ladin, this outrage turned against us. Terrorism, remember, is a political activity. So is the struggle against it. We and the terrorists are competing for the support of the same people. All that we do against terrorism, including our use of force, must be guided by this fact.

Second, as just suggested, we have learned that international cooperation is essential in the fight against terrorism. That cooperation, painstakingly constructed over the

Balancing the different requirements of security and liberty will remain the single most important task in our effort to counter terrorism.

past 30 years, was on display recently in the way that Canadian and German authorities worked with the U.S. government to address the New Year terrorist threats. In a world such as ours, where people, ideas and things move easily and quickly across borders, international cooperation is increasingly critical for success against terrorism.

Third, as the increasing traffic across our borders testifies, we have found ways to improve our security without restricting our liberties. The number of people flying has increased enormously in the same period that we have imposed strict security measures on air travel. More traffic crosses our borders today than at any time in our history but, contrary to what some people think, we have more control over our borders now than ever before. According to media reports, border police

near San Diego are complaining of boredom.

This last point—balancing security and liberty—has become more important lately, given the possibility that an attack with a mass casualty weapon could occur in the United States. For even if such attacks are unlikely, they are potentially so devastating that steps must be taken to prevent them and deal with their consequences.

As Federal officials pondered the horrendous consequences of such an attack, questions arose about whether plans to prevent or deal with them were sacrificing some of our traditional liberties. Should police search powers be increased or the military given more domestic responsibility? In certain cases, the flexibility of our Federal system has allowed us to address the dangers of a mass casualty attack without any loss of liberty. For example, the National Guard, subject to the authority of State Governors and not the Federal government, and with an established role in disaster relief, has been given responsibility to prepare for the consequences of such an attack. (Ohio was recently chosen as one of the States where the National Guard would play this role.)

But not all issues related to the proper balance of security and liberty will be so happily resolved. Given the possibility of a mass casualty attack, balancing the different requirements of security and liberty has become and will remain the single most important task in our effort to counter terrorism.

David Tucker teaches at the United States Naval Postgraduate School, and is an Adjunct Fellow at the Ashbrook Center. He is the author of Skirmishes at the Edge of Empire: The United States and International Terrorism.

Military Ethos and the Politics of “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell”

Mackubin Thomas Owens

On December 11, President Bill Clinton issued an unprecedented public rebuke of the American military. Without prior warning or consultation, the commander-in-chief claimed in a CBS News radio interview that the military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy regarding homosexuals was not being implemented “as the leaders of our military ... in 1993 pledged to implement it.” By suggesting that military commanders have twisted the policy into an anti-homosexual instrument, President Clinton has undermined the moral authority of commanders at all levels, ultimately making it more difficult for them to carry out this very difficult compromise, one that he accepted at the behest of a Democratic-controlled Congress seven years ago.

All of us, especially the commissioned and non-commissioned officers who have been striving to comply with the “don’t ask, don’t tell”

policy, despite its difficulties, are entitled to ask: why has it taken the president seven years to identify the alleged flaws in the policy? And if he believes there are flaws, why didn’t he require the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to conduct a formal review, rather than gratuitously reprimand the US military as an institution in a public forum?

On the one hand, the president’s critics answer that, as is his usual practice, Mr. Clinton is subordinating an issue of national security—military effectiveness—to the dictates of short-term political expediency: helping his wife with a core Democratic constituency in her New York Senate race. Mrs. Clinton advocates a change in policy that would permit homosexuals to serve openly in the military.

On the other hand, Mr. Clinton claims to be acting according to the most high-minded principles. The

president and his defenders claim he was moved by the brutal murder of PFC Barry Winchell, a homosexual soldier at Fort Campbell, Kentucky last summer.

But the core of the president’s public criticism is that the military has violated the spirit of the compromise by actively seeking out and discharging homosexuals. “The original intent,” said the president during the radio interview, “was that people would not be rooted out, that they would not be questioned If they didn’t violate the code of conduct (sic) and they didn’t tell,” they wouldn’t be subjected to harassment.

In an article that appeared in the *Wall Street Journal* shortly after the president’s interview, Professor Charles Moskos of Northwestern University, dean of American military sociologists and the primary architect of the “don’t ask, don’t tell”

Owens: *continued on page 7*

From the Ashbrook Shelf...

Founding the Criminal Law:


Punishment and Political Thought in the Origins of America

by **Ronald J. Pestritto**

Northern Illinois University Press, 2000

ISBN 0-8758-0260-5

Why does society punish criminals? What political principles underlie the determination of punishment? In *Founding the Criminal Law*, Pestritto, an adjunct fellow at the Ashbrook Center, analyzes policies concerning crime and punishment in early America as a means to better understand political thought during the founding era and to shed light on modern debates about the consequences of lawbreaking. Basing his research on original government documents, state constitutions, the arguments of America’s founders, and the writings of such influential reformers as William Penn, William Bradford, and Thomas Jefferson, Pestritto analyzes the complex mix of punishment philosophies at work in early America.



Owens: *continued from page 6*

policy, questioned the assumptions underlying Mr. Clinton's remarks. Regarding the murder of PFC Winchell, Mr. Moskos asked, "had [he] been openly gay, would his fellow soldiers have been more restrained? Indeed, opponents of homosexuals in the military easily could use the murder to argue that the military should return to its traditional policy of asking one's sexual orientation and discharging anyone even suspected of being homosexual."

What about the increase in the number of discharges of homosexuals? It is true that such discharges have nearly doubled—from 617 in 1994 to 1145 in 1998. But as Mr. Moskos points out, while the number of discharges for homosexual "acts" actually has declined over this period, 80 percent of homosexuality-related discharges are the result of voluntary statements. Furthermore, almost all discharges for homosexuality occur in the first term of enlistment, and more than half in the first year.

The fact that so many of those who voluntarily claim to be homosexuals do so early in their enlistment is an important point. As Gen. Carl Mundy, former Commandant of the Marine Corps observed, this "is a very demanding period during which it is not uncommon for those who are not equal to the challenge of military life to seek opportunities for release from the service. A claim to be homosexual, whether factual or not, provides such an opportunity." These figures call into question the claim that the increase in discharges of homosexuals is due to the actions of overzealous commanders.

As Professor Moskos acknowledges, there are foolish reasons for excluding homosexuals from the armed forces, but that does not mean we should ignore the good ones. And

the most important one is expressed in the statute passed by the same Democratic Congress in 1993 that gave us "don't ask, don't tell"—homosexuality is incompatible with military service. Open homosexuality undermines the military ethos upon which success in war ultimately depends.

Winning the nation's wars is the military's functional imperative. Indeed, it is the only reason for a liberal society to maintain a military organization. War is terror. War is confusion. War is characterized by chance, uncertainty, and friction. The military's ethos constitutes an evolutionary response to these factors—an attempt to minimize their impact.

To achieve success on the battlefield, military organizations must overcome the paralyzing effects of fear on the individual soldier. Accordingly, the military stresses such martial virtues as courage, both physical and moral, a sense of honor and duty, discipline, a professional code of conduct, and loyalty, and places a premium on such factors as unit cohesion and morale.

The glue of the military ethos is what the Greeks called *philia*—friendship, comradeship, or brotherly love. *Philia*, the bond among disparate individuals who have nothing in common but facing death and misery together, is the source of the unit cohesion that most research has shown to be critical to battlefield success.

The importance of *philia* is described by J. Glen Gray in *The Warriors: Reflections on Men in Battle*: "Numberless soldiers have died, more or less willingly, not for country or honor or religious faith or for any other abstract good, but because they realized that by fleeing their posts and rescuing themselves, they would expose their companions to greater danger.

"Such loyalty to the group is the

essence of fighting morale. The commander who can preserve and strengthen it knows that all other physical and psychological factors are little in comparison. The feeling of loyalty, it is clear, is the result, not the cause, of comradeship. Comrades are loyal to each other spontaneously and without any need for reasons."

Owens: *continued on page 8*

Spring 2000 Major Issues Lecture Series

Jim Petro

Auditor, State of Ohio
on
"Restoring Public Trust"
Wednesday, February 16
Noon

Barbara Dafoe Whitehead

*Author of The Divorce Culture:
Rethinking Our Commitments
to Marriage and Family*
on
"The Future of Marriage"
Tuesday, March 28
Noon

Stephen Black

*Former United Nations
Weapons Inspector*
on
"Disarming Iraq:
Technical Success,
Political Failure"
Wednesday, April 12
Noon

*Tickets for the luncheons
are \$15 each or \$120
for a table of eight.*

*For reservations contact
Cheryl Given at
(419)289-5428*

Owens: *continued from page 7*

Philia depends on fairness and the absence of favoritism. In the military environment, fairness is crucial. Indeed, it is the coin of the realm. The military ethos is dependent on everyone's understanding that the criteria for allocating danger and recognition, both positive (promotion, awards, etc.) and negative (non-judicial punishment, courts-martial, etc.), are essentially objective. Favoritism and double standards are deadly to *philia* and its associated phenomena—cohesion, morale, and discipline—elements of the military ethos that are absolutely critical to the success of a military organization.

The presence of open homosexuals in the close confines of ships or military units opens the possibility that *eros* will be unleashed into an environment based on *phila*, creating friction and corroding the very source of military excellence itself. It does so by undermining the non-sexual bonding essential to unit cohesion as described by Gray.

For unlike *philia*, *eros* is sexual, and therefore individual and exclusive. *Eros* manifests itself as sexual competition, protectiveness, and favoritism, all of which undermine order, discipline, and morale. As James Webb, the best-selling novelist and former Secretary of the Navy has

observed, “there is no greater or more natural bias than that of an individual toward a beloved. And few emotions are more powerful, or more distracting, than those surrounding the pursuit of, competition for, or the breaking off of amorous relationships.”

The destructive impact of such relationships on unit cohesion can be denied only ideologues. Does a superior order his or her beloved into danger? If he or she demonstrates

Homosexuality is incompatible with military service. Open homosexuality undermines the military ethos upon which success in war ultimately depends.

favoritism, what is the consequence for unit morale and discipline? What happens when jealousy rears its head? These are questions of life and death and help to explain why open homosexuality and homosexual behavior traditionally have been considered incompatible with military service.

Recently, a number of policy analysts and scholars have raised the specter of a growing “gap” between the US military and the society it is sworn to protect. A new scholarly study confirms that there is a grow-

ing divergence between the attitudes of the military and a civilian elite that largely has forsaken the military in the all-volunteer era. This “participation” gap underlies Mr. Clinton's remarks regarding “don't ask, don't tell” and adumbrates a threat to the long-term health of the Republic.

All too often, the American civilian elite sees the military ethos not as something that contributes to military effectiveness, but as a problem to be eradicated in the name of multiculturalism, sexual politics, and the politics of “sexual orientation.” At a minimum, elite opinion contends that the military is obligated to adapt to contemporary liberal values, patterns of behavior, and social mores no matter how adversely they might affect the military's ability to carry out its functional imperative. The president's remarks illustrate the danger of the participation gap—the propensity of the American civilian elite, ignorant of the requirements of military ethos, to subordinate the military's functional imperative to a societal one at the cost of military effectiveness.

Mackubin T. Owens is Professor of Strategy and Force Planning at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island and an Adjunct Fellow at the Ashbrook Center.



**JOHN M. ASHBROOK
CENTER FOR PUBLIC AFFAIRS**
Ashland University

ON PRINCIPLE is a bi-monthly publication of the John M. Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs at Ashland University. The opinions expressed in **ON PRINCIPLE** do not necessarily reflect the views of the Ashbrook Center or Ashland University or their respective Boards of Advisors. Executive Director: Peter W. Schramm; Director of Development: Thomas W. Roepke; Assistant to the Director: Cheryl Given; Director of Special Programs: Roger Beckett; Assistant to the Director of Development: Cynthia Kandel; Administrative Assistant: Kelly Griffin.

Ashbrook Center for Public Affairs
Ashland University, Ashland, OH 44805-3799
(419) 289-5411
<http://www.ashbrook.org>